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THE BIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Alan Watson*
THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS:

STUDIES IN CICERO'S PRO

CAECINA. By Bruce W. Frier. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1985. Pp. xxiv, 317. $36.

This is a properly scholarly book, written by Bruce W. Frier, one
of the best American historians writing on Roman law. I stress this
because this review will be largely critical: I find the book unconvincing in its conclusions. Also, the author attempts to tell more than one
story in the book, an approach that seems misguided. Frier begins his
preface:
I have two stories to tell. The first is the story of a lawsuit brought more
than two millennia ago, and of the remarkable speech delivered during
it; the second is the story of how, in the decades preceding and following
this lawsuit, the legal profession originated and first rose to influence.
My conviction, upon which this book is based, is that these two stories
are interlinked, though not in a direct causal way; they are interlinked
because neither story is completely comprehensible without the other.

[p. xi]

In telling these stories the author weaves in a great deal of Roman
background. We are told, for instance, of the physical appearance of
the court and of how the participants in a lawsuit dressed and conducted themselves (pp. 57-63); and also of modern sociological theory,
on subjects such as legitimation through judicial procedure (pp. 23652).
My uneasiness begins with this opening paragraph and with the
title of the book. The main cause of uneasiness is not that telling two
stories makes the narrative very complicated, as it does; nor that Frier
never demonstrates that he is justified in drawing general conclusions
about the rise of the Roman jurists from the individual lawsuit involving Cicero's famous speech, pro Caecina. Nor is it that, despite the
title of the book, arguments detailing the causes of the rise of the Roman jurists are rather sparse, and almost give the impression that this
theme is included as an afterthought (even though Chapter Seven,
Conclusion: The Professionalization of Law, is devoted to it). The
cause of my uneasiness is that, with this focus on one lawsuit, Frier
does not take the long historical view of the rise of the jurists. The
scene for their rise in fact was set long before the middle of the second
• University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. M.A., LL.B., Glasgow; D. Phil.,
D.C.L., Oxon; LL.D., Edinburgh. - Ed.
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century B.C., and their rise is incomprehensible unless earlier circumstances are fully taken into account. Frier's approach causes him to
fail to address the fundamental question in the rise of the jurists: Why
ever did the Roman state allow (or even encourage) private individuals, whose separation as jurists from politics Frier stresses, to have
such importance in the making of law? Frier's two stories would have
been better kept apart.
In the review that follows I will discuss only his treatment of the
rise of the jurists (which ought to be the more important subject).
Frier's approach causes him to exaggerate fatally (a) the extent to
which Quintus Mucius Scaevola (consul in 95 B.C.) marked a new
beginning; (b) the separation of the Praetor (and his Edict) from the
authority of the jurists; (c) the uncertainty of the law and the significance of this; and (d) the extent to which the jurists had a common
strategy.
Frier writes in his preface:
We know that in the late Republic, more or less during Cicero's lifetime,
Roman legal science made important advances. During the second and
early first century B.C., the stability of the Roman judicial system had
been shaken by two important events: the introduction of important procedural reforms, mainly through the Praetor's Edict, and the emergence
of rhetorical advocacy in pleadings. Both events tended to increase legal
insecurity. The jurisconsults, Rome's unofficial legal experts, at first reacted slowly and rather tentatively to these challenges. At last, however,
in the early first century B.C. a small group of jurisconsults (Q. Mucius
Scaevola and his students) sought to counter disintegrative influences on
law by reconstructing their ancient craft as a more autonomous and intellectual discipline. Their aim was evidently to secure for themselves
and for law a more commanding presence within the Roman judicial
system and Roman society generally. In essence, they ceased to be jurisconsults only, and became jurists as well, with major consequences for
subsequent Western law. Through these men the legal profession walked
for the first time onto the stage of history; the late Republican jurists
were clearly "professionals" in that they possessed and exploited specific
knowledge and skills which were inaccessible to laymen, and in that they
also had at least rudimentary forms of regularized intercommunication,
work autonomy, specialist literature, colleague "control," organized education, and even ethics. [p. xiii]

It is on this paragraph and on Frier's remarks connected with it that I
wish to center my review.
I agree, of course, that the period saw "important procedural reforms, mainly through the Praetor's Edict." But I would not accept
that the "stability of the judicial system had been shaken" thereby.
Rather, the reforms increased the stability of the system by modernizing it and making it more suitable for a society on the move. Frier
does not explain how the stability of the system was shaken.
These procedural reforms, I think Frier would hold, were of two
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kinds. One was the replacement through the Praetor of the archaic
formal procedure known as legis actiones by the flexible formulae,
which Frier partially attributes (and many would agree) to the lex
Aebutia (p. 157). The other procedural reform comprised the introduction of new actions. These might be entirely original, such as those
for the contracts of sale and hire, which were set out with their formulae in the Edict - whether or not the Praetor also issued an edict 1
stating that he would grant an action on a sale or hire. Or they might
be actions, such as several controlling succession, that in effect blocked
the old civil law rules which may have been set out in the XII Tables.
By controlling legal proceedings, the Praetor in effect changed the
law. But if it was a legislative body (which passed the lex Aebutia) and
the Praetor who were responsible for these procedural reforms that
had a profound effect on the substance and modernity of the law, then
- and this is the first point I wish to take up from Frier's paragraph
- how can it be, as Frier claims, the jurists who got rid of archaic
law? Frier says of the jurists: "Their achievement lay in the liberation
of Roman private law from its stultifying archaic formalism, in the
ascendancy of the quasi-ethical principle bona fides, and in the creation of a juristic method for managing legal materials" (p. 193). Yet I
cannot think of one example where a jurist qua jurist freed private law
from archaism: the abolition of the fundamental archaism - from
legis actio to formula - was the work of legislator and Praetor. New
remedies were again the creation of the Praetor. 2 Frier in this context
also says: "Yet we are told that in conversation Q. Mucius was wont
to stress the fundamental importance for Roman law of the concept
bonafides and the actions ex.fide bona (Cic. Off. 3.70)" (p. 159). Yet
where exactly do we find the setting of the words ex fide bona? The
answer is precisely in the Praetor's Edict, in the formulae for actions
such as those on sale (emptio venditio) or guardianship (tutela). Insofar as the jurists are to be given credit for the development of concepts
such as bona fides it is because the Praetor, responsible for the notion
in his Edict, left its working-out in detail to the jurists. The relationship between Praetor's Edict and the development of the law by the
jurists is close.
But Frier seems to keep the Praetor and the jurists at arm's length.
Thus, he attributes the introduction of the actio de dolo - not, as he
habitually calls it, actio doli - to Aquillius Gallus as jurist, not as
Praetor (pp. 148, 262). His argument for this is that the dramatic date
- not the date of writing - of Cicero's De Natura Deorum (in which
the action is mentioned) is 76 B.C. and Gallus became Praetor only in
1. The term "Edict" with a capital letter is used to designate the whole praetorian apparatus
setting out formulae and clauses promising a remedy, whereas "edict" is used to denote an individual clause of the Edict.
2. Frier shows himself to be not unaware of this. See p. 193.
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66 B.C. But this is a weak argument compared with that in favor of
Gallus as Praetor, an argument that Frier does not discuss. In the De
Officiis 3.60, Cicero writes: "Nondum enim C. Aquillius, collega et
familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas" (For my colleague
and friend C. Aquillius, had not yet brought forth his formulae on
fraud). But the verb proferre (used also in De Natura Deorum 3. 74) is
more appropriate for official promulgation than unofficial recommendation. And it is precisely as Praetors in the year 66 B.C. that Cicero
and Aquillius Gallus were colleagues! Frier also says: "Other late Republican innovations bear the names of jurists: the actio Serviana,
governing security for debt and named probably for Servius; the
iudicium Cascellianum, against contumacious defendants of possessory interdicts, named for A. Cascellius" (p. 262). But if the actio
Serviana is named for Servius this might be because, as J.M. Kelly
argues, he was responsible for it as Praetor, which he was in 65 B.C. 3
Other remedies certainly do bear names which could be those of
Praetors not known as jurists: interdictum Salvianum (a Salvius was
praetor urbanus around 74 B.C.); actio Publiciana (Q. Publicius was
Praetor around 67 B.C.); actio Calvisiana (a Calvisius was Praetor in
46 B.C.). 4
The reason for this distancing of jurist and Praetor lies, I believe,
in Frier's belief that the rise of the jurists in part results from their
response to the increase in legal insecurity caused by the growth of the
Edict. He makes much of this supposed legal insecurity resulting from
the Edict. This brings me to the second point I wish to take up from
the paragraph quoted from Frier's preface. Frier stresses that the jurists of the last century of the Republic were no longer senators but
were from the lower ranks of equites, a fact that he believes needs
explanation (pp. 256-60). The equites, many of whom were involved
in banking, trade, or public contracting, would be interested in calculating the legal consequences of their acts, and would be keen on legal
security (pp. 257-58). But Frier himself implicitly admits that one
cannot prove that the equites actively sought legal security (p. 258).
Nor can one show - I don't think Frier even tries to show - that the
jurists sought to give legal security. One can show that the jurists interpreted the Edict and the civil law; one cannot show that the jurists
thereby sought to give greater legal security, since in fact it is a
marked characteristic of the jurists that they frequently disagreed in
their opinions. Different interpretations may increase legal insecurity.
And in the absence of a juristic attempt to secure unanimity, one cannot without evidence claim a policy of the jurists to promote security.
Nor is it really clear that the growth of the Edict would contribute
3. Kelly, The Growth-Pattern of the Praetor's Edict, 1 IRISH JURIST 341, 347 (1966).
4. See A. WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 32 (1974). The identifications are not secure.
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to legal insecurity, though it certainly would contribute to legal development, including the making of law favorable to commerce. Certainly it is true that the clauses of the Edict are brief, technical, and,
on their face, incomprehensible to the layman. But the conclusions
are not, and cannot be, those drawn by Frier. Take, for example, one
of the two model formulae for the consensual contract of sale (emptio
venditio), that which was available to the buyer:
Whereas AA bought from NN the slave on account of whom the action
is brought, whatever on that account NN ought to give to or do for AA
in accordance with good faith, in that amount, judge, condemn NN to
AA. If it does not appear, absolve him.

This praetorian innovation as it stands will not tell a lay purchaser
much: not what the requirements are for a valid contract of sale, not
what the seller's obligations to him are, not what his own duties are,
not what damages will be due for any default. But we should not conclude therefore that in creating the contract of sale and so developing
the law the Praetor was deliberately or negligently increasing its insecurity, hence giving rise to the need for a new class of jurists who
would remedy his deficiencies. Rather the implication must be that
the Praetor could afford to be so brief because those people who might
get involved with a lawsuit in whatever capacity had some idea of the
nature of the contract and of their rights and duties under it. As with
almost all "legislation," details of interpretation are left to be worked
out later.
But where does this general knowledge of the law come from? The
extreme brevity of edictal clauses makes sense only on the assumption
that such knowledge exists: it does not come from public officials; it
comes too late in the course of a dispute if it comes from judges (who,
in any event, are laymen). In Roman circumstances it can only come
from persons like jurists who, we know, existed, and who wrote and
gave opinions about law, and whose views were treated with high regard. In other words, it was not insecurity of law caused by the
growth of the Praetor's Edict - whose clauses were, on their face,
obscure - that brought about the rise of the jurists. Rather, it was the
existence of persons learned in the law that enabled the Praetor to
issue such brief, apparently uninformative, edictal clauses. 5 Moreover,
this development suggests a certain closeness, even cooperation, between Praetor and jurist. The former had no qualms in allowing the
law largely to be developed by the latter; the latter was happy with the
task he voluntarily and gratuitously took upon himself. But what is
further instructive about the example just chosen from emptio venditio
is precisely that that contract came into being at least a century before,
5. But leaving the scope of the formulae to be determined by subsequent juristic opinion does
make for some ambiguity. See A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY 20-21 (1984).
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on Frier's approach, the rise of the jurists. It is hard to believe that a
century later, but not before, a small group of jurisconsults sought to
counter disintegrative influences resulting from suchformulae. In addition to what has gone before, I should also say that Frier nowhere
produces any evidence to support the use of the word "sought": there
is no evidence of any common purpose among the jurists.
Frier emphasizes the role of Q. Mucius Scaevola as the founder of
this movement. For instance, he discusses Q. Mucius' strategy to raise
the intellectual content and authority of the civil law as expounded by
the jurists, to defend the civil law from the disintegrative influences of
the rapidly evolving Praetor's Edict, and to give the jurists a firm base
to exert and increase their influence on the courts (pp. 168-71). This
brings me to my third point on the quotation from Frier's preface,
namely that although one must not downplay Q. Mucius' importance
as a jurist (and I think I am not in danger of doing so)6 he does not fit
into Frier's scheme of development. To begin with, as Frier is certainly aware and indirectly shows (p. 253), Q. Mucius was not an
eques but a senator, with even two consular ancestors. 7 Hence, intentions ascribed by Frier to jurists because they were equites cannot
without more ado be attributed to Q. Mucius, the leader of the group!
But Frier seems not to address the issue.
Nor can I see anything in Q. Mucius' work on the civil law that
would justify a claim that with it he was seeking to counter disintegrative influences on law. It seems to be simply a commentary on law,
the first to set out the civil law generatim; a good commentary at that,
which served as a model for later works and which certainly raised
legal writing to a higher level. Frier, surprisingly perhaps, in the body
of his text nowhere attempts to demonstrate what further aims Q.
Mucius might have had. To modem eyes Q. Mucius' books have defects, especially omissions, 8 and it is precisely in these that one might
try to spot his ultimate aims. The work is archaic; matters not provided with a proper action by the later third century B.C. are omitted.
But there is in these omissions no sign of any hostility to the Edict; as
Frier notes, praetorian actions, such as those on sale or partnership,
that can be attached to older institutions are discussed (p. 160).
Others are omitted. But so are whole subjects of the civil law that
were important, such as marriage, divorce, dowry, cura, and slavery.
My own tentative suggestion for Q. Mucius' omissions would be as
follows. He cannot have made a conscious decision to omit all subjects that had no proper action by the later third century B.C. Apart
from the obvious absurdity of any such course of behavior, he would
6. See A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 143-58.
7. See especially W. KUNKEL, HERKUNFT UNO SOZIALE STELLUNG DER RtlMJSCHEN JURJSTEN 18 (1952).
8. See, e.g., pp. 159-60; A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 143-58.
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have lacked historical knowledge to date the emergence of law.
Rather, he was a traditionalist and was following some older, now unknown, model whose roots lay in the distant past and which concentrated on actions. Certainly it is only in this way that one can explain
omissions from the much later Sabinus' commentary on the civil law;
in his tum Sabinus was relying on the model of Q. Mucius. 9 Q.
Mucius' work is not a new beginning; even if it were, it certainly does
not provide evidence that he was seeking to counter disintegrative influences on civil law.
. In emphasizing the "quantum leap in legal science" (p. 163) made
by Q. Mucius, Frier claims that "Q. Mucius also begins to deploy
loose canons for interpretation" (p. 162). Now, in the absence of direct information on previous legal interpretation, it would be impossible to prove that earlier interpretation was always narrow; and Frier
produces no evidence for his assertion. But in fact it is possible to
show indirectly that wide interpretation was used before Q. Mucius.
Thus, mancipatio was originally a formal conveyance of certain kinds
of important property known as res mancipi. The ceremony conveyed
the thing at once. Yet even before the XII Tables of the mid-fifth
century B.C. the unofficial practice had grown up of using the ceremony to make a will which would have future effect, even for the disposition of things that were not res mancipi and even for the
appointment of guardians. This practice was given official recognition
by the XII Tables. 10 Likewise, at some early date, though after the
XII Tables, mancipatio came to be used to permit adoption. 11 And
further similar examples can be adduced. None of this could have
occurred unless there was already a very flexible attitude to the use
made of law, and this must have extended to canons of interpretation.
The fourth and final point which I wish to take up is the issue of
"autonomy of law," which is the concern of the second half of the
quotation from Frier's preface. Frier discusses this issue in various
places and in various ways. He says, for instance:
"Autonomous law" is less a systematic doctrine oflaw than a loose bundle of characteristically juxtaposed ideas, which together constitute a
sort of "ideal type." Among these ideas are
(1) strong separation of law from politics, and a consequent emphasis on the independence of the judicial system from political influence as
well as on the division between legislative and judicial functions of
government;
(2) a conception of law as a self-consistent body of rules that are
applied in individual cases and that, because of their existence, both limit
9. See A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 144-45. For tentative acceptance of my explanation of
omissions from Q. Mucius, see E. RAWSON, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC 208 (1985).
10. See A. WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES, PERSONS AND PROPERTY 52-70 (1975).
11. See id. at 42.
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the discretion of the judicial system and help to prevent it from intruding
into politics;
(3) an emphasis on procedural regularity and fairness (formal justice) as the primary end and competence of a judicial system; and
(4) a beliefthat "fidelity to law" means primarily obedience to established rules of positive law and, likewise, a conviction that changes in
law (at any rate, major changes) must be channeled through the political
process. [pp. 188-89; footnote omitted]

And he regards "autonomous law" as largely the creation of, and the
result of the work of, the late Republican jurists (pp. 191-92, 258, 25960, 281).
Now the nature of the autonomous law is clear in the works of the
late Republican jurists. But it is also an integral part of law in Western systems and is always prominent, at least when law is not being
used in the forefront of political revolution. It existed long before the
late Roman Republic, although the scarcity of evidence does not admit of much detail. Whether the notion of autonomy is expressed or
not or is fully developed in theoretical writings, it exists wherever
there is recognition that law operates as a separate entity in society,
with its own standards for correctness, its own methods of reasoning
toward a solution, and as being authoritative in its own right. In other
words, a procedure or decision is "right" precisely because it is in harmony with approaches to legal thinking, and not because of other societal concerns. 12 But then the autonomy of law in Frier's terms is
already very obvious in the ancient dodges and devices to give further
scope to an institution such as mancipatio. Originally, as I have said, a
formal conveyance, mancipatio was used even before the XII Tables to
make a will and to give a husband power (manus) over his wife in the
ceremony of coemptio; and at some early date to create servitudes over
land, as a form of real security in jiducia, to adopt a son by adoptio,
and to release a son from paternal power by emancipatio. The validity
of such devices 13 is accepted in practice because they correspond to
recognized standards of legal reasoning, 14 their acceptance is by the
judicial system, they are independent of direct political influence, 15
and they are treated as valid not just in one instance but generally.
Frier's main point is, of course, that the autonomy of law is a particularly marked feature of late Republican law (and was actively
sought by the jurists). It was indeed a particularly marked feature of
late Republican law, but one need see in that no more than a reflection
of the fa~t that by that time law had come to be highly developed.
12. See, e.g., A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 67-74 (1985).
13. On dodges and devices, see especially Daube, Fraud No. 3, in THE LEGAL MIND I (N.
MacConnick & P. Birks eds. 1986).
14. If the results simply corresponded to societal notions of rightness, independently of law,
there would be no need to cloak the devices in the form of a mancipatio.
15. Political intervention has no need of "devices."
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Having disagreed so much with Frier, I feel it incumbent on me to
provide a more plausible alternative and sketch out my own views on
the role of the jurists in Republican legal development, on their relationship to the Praetor's Edict, and on why in the last century of the
Republic the jurists were predominantly equites.
The fundamental question is why jurists - private individuals were allowed to give opinions that were important for creating legal
rules. Closely allied to that is the second question, why men of status
found it worthwhile to give legal opinions for no direct financial remuneration, and why their prestige - social or political - was enhanced
by such activity. In the western world this has happened neither before
nor since. The answers are revealed if we begin at the beginning, long
before Cicero or his speech pro Caecina.
Pomponius, a jurist of the second century A.D., tells us that after
the promulgation of the XII Tables authoritative interpretation of the
law and of the conduct of actions at law was in the hands of the College of Pontiffs. 16 This was entirely appropriate. To be effective, law
must be interpreted. The pontiffs did not belong to a specific caste of
priests, nor did they devote their whole time to religious observance.
They were men of substance, successful in public life, and, until 300
B.C., patricians. They were close to the men who ruled the city and
were, in addition, an organized group whose talent was recognized.
They had in fact many of the attributes that Frier associates with a
"profession" (p. 157).
Each year, so Pomponius goes on, one of the College of Pontiffs
was appointed to preside over private citizens. The chosen man would
then give the opinion of the College on the interpretation of the law,
and his declaration would be authoritative. Reasonable as this was
from the point of view of the government, it had an interesting consequence. Patricians, members of the College of Pontiffs and aspirants
thereto, wished to be learned in the law. Advancement to the College
would be helped thereby, their prestige among their colleagues in the
College and other patricians would be increased, and so would their
reputation among the populace at large.
Eventually the College of Pontiffs lost its monopoly of interpretation. As a result, juristic interpretation lost its legitimacy, and legal
authority its unitary voice. 17 But cultural tradition, once established,
dies hard. A high reputation still resulted from the giving of good
legal opinions, and men of the highest rank continued to want to increase their prestige through legal expertise. Anyone might, in theory,
give a legal opinion, but the worth of any opinion was still largely
16. DIG. 1.2.2.6 (Pomponius, Libra Singulari Enchiridii). Frier refers to this history on p.
157.
17. See A. WATSON, supra note 5, at 2-3.
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determined by the status of the person who gave it; in practice the
dominant jurisconsults continued to be from society's highest ranks.
Change came, however, with the development of the Praetor's
Edict, especially when the Praetor began to issue edicts - not just the
formulae for new actions - that had the effect of substantially changing the law. Only around 100 B.C. did it happen that Praetors could
issue edicts creating totally new actions on substantive law.1 8 This
greatly affected the jurisconsults. They were in active cooperation
with the Praetor. They could suggest new edicts or formulae, and the
Praetor was generally content to leave the interpretation of the Edict
to them. But in this cooperation the role of the Praetor dominated. He
was under no compulsion to follow the jurists' recommendations, and,
if he did not favor their interpretation of an edictal clause, he could
change the wording to tilt it to his intent. And the wording of edictal
clauses often was changed. 19 The role of the jurisconsult was only that
which the Praetor was willing to allot him. This held true even for
interpretation of the civil law, for if a Praetor did not like what was
happening there, he was at full liberty to issue an edict amending the
law. The role of jurisconsult was no longer a suitable one for a senator.
The way was open for lesser mortals, equites, who gained in prestige
through their association with the Praetor. These jurists necessarily
worked harder at law than their predecessors. The value of their legal
opinions did not come from their social position. Rather, their social
position came from the worth of their legal expertise. They continued
to give legal opinions, but they were more likely to be noticed by their
fellow jurists, Praetors, and prominent citizens if they published
books, whether collections of responsa or legal commentaries. It was
every jurist for his own reputation. There is nothing here akin to
Frier's description: "This is the tacit bargain that Q. Mucius and his
students offered to the Romans: increased security in private law in
exchange for the greater prestige of legal experts" (p. 191).
The rise of the "profession" of jurists in the late Republic was the
result of the increased importance of law at that time. Frier stresses
that the impact of jurists' law on the Roman judicial system was
profound because of external factors, and of these he gives pride of
place to the dramatic increase in the number of citizens (p. 273). This
is to tum things upside down. Any impact from the huge increase in
the citizen body would have been directly on the judicial system and
the Praetor's Edict, and thus indirectly on the development of jurists'
law.
·
Of course, it remains a question why Roman law developed then as
thoroughly as it did. Part of the answer is that this development was
simply one aspect of the quick expansion of high culture at Rome then
18. For this argument, see A. WATSON, supra note 4, at 31-62.
19. See id. at 33-34.
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and in the succeeding Principate, which is seen also in sculptured portrait busts, architecture, and various genres of literature. And for
many modem scholars the period of true classical law, as of the apex
of some other aspects of culture, is restricted to the Principate. Another part of the answer is simply that no full answer can be given to
the question why one area of culture rather than another develops at a
particular time and place. Why, one might ask without the hope of a
complete answer, the interest in philosophy, of all things, in ancient
Greece?
If one insists on knowing why jurists' law was so important in the
late Republic, then the answer on one level is that, as I have tried to
show, the machinery for the importance of juristic law was in place
long before, and the increasing complexity of the society simply
caused the wheels of this machinery to tum ever faster. On another
level, the answer lies in the nature of a state's need for legal rules regulating the behavior of individuals among themselves. Such rules are
needed to inhibit unregulated conflict. But provided the money required for governmental expenditure is made available and breaches of
the state's peace are controlled, the central organs of government need
be little concerned with the content of much of private law. It is this,
as I hope to show elsewhere,20 that explains much of the evolution of
English common law. Much of law was under the control of other
courts before the rise of the king's courts. And much of law could be
left to the control of these other courts. Kings and their ministers
have no need to care about what happens before such courts, provided
the king's peace is kept and the tax money rolls in. Kings and politicians have more fun things to do with their time. Likewise at Rome.
In Rome, though, there was no need to raise tax money through the
judicial system. And it can scarcely be overemphasized that the jurists' role was almost entirely confined to private law - therein lies
the key to their success. So long as the Praetor kept his eye on the
broad development of the law and on the jurists, and so long as the
jurists were willing to undertake for free the chore of developing private law and making it more systematic, the politicians would have
been crazy not to let them just get on with it. The content of most
rules of private law is of little significance for rulers provided there is
someone to give substance to the rules.
Though I disagree greatly with the arguments and conclusions I
have discussed, I find this to be a stimulating book. And I have said
nothing about the excellent bringing to life of the lawsuit for which
Cicero wrote his speech on behalf of Caecina. The divergence of our
conclusions on the rise of the jurists and related matters follows in
large part from a fundamental difference in the approaches of Bruce
20. A. WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (forthcoming book arising from
the Julius Rosenthal lectures to be delivered at Northwestern University School of Law in 1987).
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Frier and myself to an understanding of how law develops in society.
Frier takes the approach favored by those interested in sociology of
law. A period of time is selected, and contemporary changes in the
law and legal system are explained with reference to the conditions
then prevailing. To me, this approach is excessively limited and distorts the vision. Of course, contemporary conditions affect legal development, and sociological study has its role to play in understanding
legal change. But law has its own traditions in which it is deeply
rooted, and to a profound extent its development is dictated by the
culture of the legal elite. 21 The role of the late Republican jurists cannot be explained so much by the context of the commercial interests of
some of the class of equites to which they belonged as by the role given
to the College of Pontiffs centuries before.
But a subsidiary part of my disagreement with Frier comes from
the fact that he is not rigorous enough in his use of the sociological
approach. It is instructive to list the weaknesses in his deductive
chain:
(1) Frier assumes but does not attempt to show that the equites,
some of whom had commercial interests, would actively seek legal certainty. Indeed, he admits in effect that he cannot demonstrate this.
(2) Frier assumes but does not attempt to show that jurists who
were equites would work in the interest of those equites who were involved with commerce.
(3) Frier asserts but never produces any evidence that the jurists
who were equites were interested in legal certainty.
(4) Frier asserts but never produces any evidence that the jurists
who were equites had some common goal and strategy.
(5) Frier never attempts to show why, if his theory is valid and the
rise of the jurists is to be explained by their status as equites seeking to
further the commercial interests of other equites, the prime mover in
this rise was Quintus Mucius Scaevola who was no eques but a prominent member of the senatorial order.
Failure to establish any one of these five propositions - and Frier
fails to establish every one of the five - entails a failure to establish
Frier's thesis of the rise of the jurists.
21. See Watson, Legal Change: Sources ofLaw and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121
(1983).

